

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: ARTICLE ON CSCE FOR EUROPA ARCHIV

REF: KORNBLUM-KLEIN TELCON, 5/30/78

1. EUROPA ARCHIV EDITOR HERMANN VOLLE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT DIRECTLY TO REQUEST AN ARTICLE FOR HIS NEXT ISSUE WHICH PRESENTS THE US VIEW OF THE BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE BY COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT MATTHEW NIMETZ WHICH IS IN RESPONSE TO VOLLE'S REQUEST. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT TO VOLLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. TEXT OF THE NIMETZ ARTICLE IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE -- A US ASSESSMENT

MATTHEW NIMETZ  
COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE WHICH CONCLUDED IN EARLY MARCH REPRESENTED BOTH A CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND

A NEW STAGE IN ITS DEVELOPMENT. THE CONFERENCE WAS THE FIRST IN THE SERIES OF "REVIEW" MEETINGS MANDATED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND CAME A LITTLE MORE THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THAT ACT WAS SIGNED BY 33 EUROPEAN NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN AUGUST, 1975. THE PURPOSE OF THE FINAL ACT WAS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND MORE HUMANE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF EAST-WEST RELA-

TIONS. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE BELGRADE MEETING WAS TO REVIEW HOW THIS CODE OF CONDUCT WAS BEING PUT INTO PRACTICE BY THE THIRTY-FIVE SIGNATORIES TO THE ACT.

SOME HAVE SAID THAT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE WAS MEANINGLESS, THAT IT REPRESENTED LITTLE MORE THAN THE EMPTY TALK BY DIPLOMATS FROM 35 COUNTRIES, AND THAT IT HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT THE MEETING ENDED WITH A SHORT AND NON-SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND THAT, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, NO NEW PROPOSALS WERE ADOPTED. HOWEVER, SUCH CRITICS MAY BE MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES, FOR THEIR ANALYSIS IGNORES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT TRANSPIRED IN BELGRADE.

FROM THE UNITED STATES POINT OF VIEW, THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE MUST BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO OUR GOALS FOR THE MEETING, NOT BY MEASURING THE LENGTH OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT NOR BY COUNTING THE PROPOSALS ADOPTED, AND CERTAINLY NOT ON THE BASIS OF AN EXPECTATION THAT ALL WOULD BE MADE RIGHT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS A PAINFULLY NEGOTIATED DOCUMENT UNCLASSIFIED

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OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WHICH, IN ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A WORKABLE AND ACCEPTABLE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERSTATE RELATIONS, SETS OUT BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIZED INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. THESE INCLUDED MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (SUCH AS NOTIFICATION OF TROOP MANEUVERS) TO PROVIDE FOR INCREASED SECURITY, AREAS OF ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL INTERCHANGE, AS WELL AS MANY ITEMS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS IN SIGNATORY COUNTRIES. AT BELGRADE THE PRIMARY AIM OF THE UNITED STATES WAS TO CARRY OUT A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTATION IN EACH OF THESE AREAS AND, BY DOING SO, TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION IN THE LONG TERM. THE FACT THAT THIS REVIEW WAS ACCOMPLISHED, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED, CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO WHAT WE CONSIDER THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE.

THAT REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION WAS SPURRED BY THE EFFORTS OF ALL WESTERN DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THAT OF THE UNITED

STATES DELEGATION, AND THIS REVIEW WAS IN FACT THE FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE FROM ITS OPENING ON OCTOBER 2 THROUGH DECEMBER 22, 1977. THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND SUCCESSFUL WESTERN INITIATIVE AT BELGRADE, AND IT ESTABLISHED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION OF MAJOR EAST-WEST ISSUES. IN PARTICULAR, IT ESTABLISHED THE LEGITIMACY OF DISCUSSION OF SUCH SENSITIVE SUBJECTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

IN INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN STATES. THE UNITED STATES WAS ABLE TO RAISE ITS SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS AND DISSIDENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE MEMBERS OF HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS IN THESE STATES. WE AIMED TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION THAT INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROMOTE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCLASSIFIED

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THE FINAL ACT BY GOVERNMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT RAISING SUCH CASES IN CSCE, OVER THE LONG RUN, WILL HELP RESOLVE SUCH CASES AND WILL PROMOTE EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN A MANNER CONSONANT WITH THE FINAL ACT.

THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, BY TOUCHING UPON SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, WENT A LONG WAY TOWARDS LAYING TO FINAL REST THE EASTERN ARGUMENT THAT DISCUSSION OF SUCH ISSUES CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE WEST HAS LONG CONSIDERED THIS ARGUMENT SPECIOUS, BUT THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE BELGRADE FORUM PERMITTED DELEGATES FROM EAST AND WEST TO GIVE THEIR POINTS OF VIEW ON THIS ISSUE AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN ARGUMENT CAME OFF MUCH THE WORSE AFTER THIS DISCUSSION. THE WEST WAS ABLE TO MAKE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT DISCUSSION, INCLUDING CRITICISM, BASED ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, CAN IN NO WAY BE CONSTRUED AS INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES BELIEVED THAT TO BE CREDIBLE--BOTH TO OTHER NATIONS AND TO OUR OWN PEOPLE--IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS THE NEGATIVE AS WELL AS THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE DURING THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. HOW COULD WE HAVE JUSTIFIED A MEETING OF NEARLY 100 DAYS IN WHICH NOTHING CRITICAL WAS SAID--WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS HOW INADEQUATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT HAS BEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES? WE WERE NOT BASHFUL ABOUT OFFERING OUR POINT OF VIEW ON ALL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. OUR GOAL WAS NOT TO STIMULATE CONFRONTATION OR TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS, BUT RATHER TO CARRY

OUT A METICULOUS REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE IN ALL AREAS UNCLASSIFIED

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COVERED BY THE FINAL ACT. WHERE CRITICISM WAS JUSTIFIED, WE VOICED OUR CONCERNS FORTHRIGHTLY AND WHEN OTHERS CRITICIZED OUR PERFORMANCE WE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND, IF THESE CRITICISMS WERE JUSTIFIED, VOICED OUR DETERMINATION TO DO BETTER. WE NOTED THE STEPS WE HAD TAKEN IN THE PAST

YEARS TO IMPROVE OUR PERFORMANCE, SUCH AS A MORE LIBERAL VISA LAW, AND DID NOT AVOID A CERTAIN MEASURE OF SELF-CRITICISM. IN OUR VIEW THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO BEING FRANK AND FORTHRIGHT DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW. IF WE HAD CHOSEN TO MUTE OUR CRITICISM IN THE HOPE OF SOME INTANGIBLE "BETTER UNDERSTANDING" WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES THIS WOULD HAVE DONE IRREPARABLE HARM TO THE HONESTY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS. THE CARRYING OUT OF AN HONEST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW IS, IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE ONLY WAY TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF CSCE.

OUR POLICY OF RAISING PROBLEMS OF NON-COMPLIANCE--FRANKLY BUT NON-POLEMICALLY--WAS SUPPORTED BY MOST PARTICIPANTS, NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED AS WELL AS ALLIES. AS THE MEETING WORE ON, THE SOVIET UNION AND MOST WARSAW PACT STATES MUST HAVE RECOGNIZED A GROWING CONSENSUS THAT HELSINKI MEANS MORE THAN THE RHETORIC OF DETENTE--IT MEANS THAT THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE MUST LOOK AT THE SUBSTANCE OF DETENTE AS WELL--HOW IT AFFECTS US ALL AS PEOPLE. WE BELIEVE THAT ADDING THIS HUMAN COMPONENT TO DETENTE--WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON PROBLEMS OF A GEOPOLITICAL NATURE, AS IMPORTANT AS THESE ARE--WILL SERVE TO STRENGTHEN DETENTE IN THE LONG TERM.

WE REGRET THAT A GENUINE DIALOGUE DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN BELGRADE. THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES REACTED DEFENSIVELY TO THE WEST'S APPRAISAL OF THEIR PERFORMANCE AND WERE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM OF THEIR PERFORMANCE IN BASKET III AND IN THE WHOLE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. EVEN WHEN CONFRONTED WITH FACTS AND STATISTICS SHOWING THAT A GREATER EFFORT WAS NECESSARY UNCLASSIFIED

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IN THIS OR THAT AREA IN ORDER TO BE IN FULLER COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT, THE SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANT TO ADMIT THIS WAS IN FACT THE CASE. WE BELIEVE THAT A GENUINE DIALOGUE ON CSCE PROBLEM AREAS WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST DURING OUR BILATERAL AND OTHER CONTACTS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS AND AT THE MADRID MEETING.

THE SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS--SOMETIMES RELUCTANTLY IN THE LATTER CASE--ALSO RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO THE INTRODUCTION OF MOST NEW PROPOSALS IN BELGRADE. IN THE WESTERN CONCEPTION SUCH PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED TO GIVE GREATER MEANING OR DEPTH TO COMMITMENTS ALREADY IN THE FINAL ACT. IN THIS SENSE, THEREFORE, THE SO-CALLED "NEW" PROPOSALS WERE NOT REALLY NEW AT ALL. NONETHELESS, THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO PERCEIVE SUCH PROPOSALS AS SOMEHOW THREATENING TO THEIR INTERESTS. IT IS ESPECIALLY CURIOUS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES AND A NUMBER OF EASTERN STATES, ESPECIALLY THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS,

ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED A NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS, THEY ENDED UP NOT SUPPORTING ANY AND DENIED CONSENSUS TO ALL PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE WEST, AND TO ALL BUT ONE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. WHY THE SOVIETS TOOK THIS ATTITUDE IS STILL NOT CLEAR TO US, FOR IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS SATISFACTORY TO ALL. IN THIS REGARD WE BELIEVE A DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONCRETE NEW PROPOSALS MIGHT BE USEFUL AMONG ALL THE CSCE COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN BELGRADE AND MADRID. SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NEXT CSCE CONFERENCE, IN ADDITION TO A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, TO ALSO REACH CONSENSUS ON A NUMBER OF NEW INITIATIVES.

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ALTHOUGH WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIETS IN PARTICULAR AND SOME OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES WERE NOT MORE FORTHCOMING IN BELGRADE, WE CONTINUE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT LESS THAN THREE YEARS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE HELSINKI. THE ESSENCE OF THE CSCE PROCESS IS, IN OUR VIEW, GRADUAL PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT. THEREFORE, WE DID NOT EXPECT BELGRADE TO SIGNAL THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCESS, BUT WE DID HOPE THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WOULD BE NOTED THERE. IN FACT, WE CONSIDER THAT WE ARE VERY MUCH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CSCE PROCESS THAN AT THE END. ALL STATES NEED TO DEVOTE THEIR CLOSE ATTENTION TO FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION IN ALL AREAS AND WE INTEND TO DISCUSS REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH ALL CSCE STATES OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

IN CONSIDERING FURTHER ACTIONS IN CSCE, THE US AND THE NATO ALLIES SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION TO SOVIET MOTIVES AND TACTICS AT BELGRADE. THE EAST CLEARLY APPROACHED BELGRADE IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, WARY OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD WOULD GIVE RISE TO EMBARRASSING CRITICISM. THEY CLEARLY HAD NOT EXPECTED THE RECEPTIVITY AMONG PEOPLES IN BOTH EAST AND

WEST TO THE FINAL ACT AND THE SERIOUS INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO ITS PROVISIONS DEALING WITH HUMANITARIAN CONTACTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS BY PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. SINCE HELSINKI, THE FINAL ACT HAD SHOWN ITS POTENTIAL AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR ENCOURAGING--AND OCCASIONALLY OBTAINING--CHANGE IN THE PRACTICES OF SOME EASTERN COUNTRIES IN SUCH AREAS AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION, BI-NATIONAL MARRIAGES, POLICY TOWARDS WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, TO NAME BUT A FEW.

THE MAJOR EASTERN OBJECTIVE AT BELGRADE THUS APPEARED TO BE DAMAGE LIMITATION THROUGH A SHORT AND GENERALIZED  
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MEETING AND A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT CONTAINING LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE AND CERTAINLY NO FURTHER HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS. IN OUR VIEW, BECAUSE A FULL AND FRANK IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW WAS CARRIED OUT, THE EAST FAILED IN ITS FIRST OBJECTIVE AND WAS ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE SECOND. THROUGH THEIR ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE STRATEGY, THE SOVIETS DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THE BELGRADE MEETING TO ESTABLISH NEW PRECEDENTS THAT COULD ENCOURAGE THEIR OWN CITIZENS TO TAKE THE FINAL ACT SERIOUSLY (AS DID ORLOV, ET AL); NEITHER, HOWEVER, DID THEY WANT BELGRADE TO DEVELOP INTO AN AREA OF US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SERIOUS DOWNTURN IN THESE RELATIONS. THEIR STRATEGY DID BETRAY, NONETHELESS, CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS. SUCH INTEREST WAS ALSO MANIFEST ON THE PART OF OTHER EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WHO OCCASIONALLY DEMONSTRATED CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENTIATIONS IN THEIR APPROACHES TO THE CONFERENCE.

WHILE EASTERN TACTICS AT THE CONFERENCE WERE LARGELY DEFENSIVE, WESTERN TACTICS WERE AIMED AT ENHANCING THE CSCE PROCESS AND AT MAKING BELGRADE A PRODUCTIVE SUBSTANTIVE MEETING THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-RUN ENHANCEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONE OF THE MORE ENCOURAGING RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE IN THIS REGARD WAS THE MAINTENANCE OF WESTERN UNITY DURING THE COMPLEX AND FAST MOVING IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW AND DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE CONFERENCE WHEN NEW PROPOSALS WERE CONSIDERED AND THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT DRAFTED. THERE WAS OFTEN A NEED TO MAKE RAPID TACTICAL DECISIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS OR SOME OTHER ASPECT OF THE CONFERENCE AND IN EACH CASE THE NATO CAUCUS IN BELGRADE PROVED AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR THE TAKING OF CRUCIAL TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS. COOPERATION WITH THE NEUTRAL/  
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NON-ALIGNED GROUP WAS ALSO EFFECTIVE. IN LIGHT OF THE BELGRADE EXPERIENCE, AND LOOKING AHEAD TOWARDS MADRID IN LATE 1980, THE ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER EVEN

MORE ADVANCED PLANNING MIGHT BE ADVISABLE BEFORE THAT MEETING, AS WELL AS MORE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AND WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS.

BETWEEN NOW AND MADRID THE WEST MIGHT ALSO USEFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO NEW PROPOSALS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED AT MADRID. WHILE WESTERN PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE EFFECTIVELY SUPPLEMENTED THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW, THE ALLIES TABLED A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS. A MORE LIMITED NUMBER OF CAREFULLY CHOSEN PRO-

POSALS MIGHT PROVE MORE EFFECTIVE IN FOCUSING WESTERN EFFORTS AND IN GAINING BROADER ACCEPTANCE. THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING SOME PROPOSALS WHICH, WHILE EXPANDING UPON THE PRINCIPALS OF CSCE, COULD BE FOUND ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE AFRAID TO DEVELOP PROPOSALS THAT WOULD HIGHLIGHT MAJOR WESTERN INTERESTS EVEN THOUGH THESE MIGHT NOT, AT FIRST GLANCE, APPEAR ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. AT MADRID WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR APPROVAL WILL REMAIN FIRM, AND SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION BUT THAT, AS AT BELGRADE, WE SEEK NO CONFRONTATION.

OF COURSE, THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE CONSISTED OF MORE THAN THE TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. AN IMPORTANT, IF NOT PIVOTAL ROLE WAS PLAYED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES WERE ACTIVE IN PURSUING THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND SEEKING COMPROMISE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AT THE MOST DIFFICULT MOMENTS OF THE MEETING. THEY OFTEN WORKED RAPIDLY TO DRAFT A SYNTHESIS OF CONFLICTING VIEWS THAT COULD SERVE AS A MEANS FOR BRIDGING DIFFERENCES. THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED ROLE WAS, IN OUR UNCLASSIFIED

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VIEW, A VERY POSITIVE ONE AND CARRIED ON THE OUTSTANDING TRADITION OF NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT OF THE CSCE PROCESS, SO EVIDENT EARLIER IN GENEVA AND HELSINKI. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION WITH ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES AS WE PREPARE FOR THE MADRID MEETING.

ONE OF THE MORE DIFFICULT MOMENTS FOR COMPROMISE CAME AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE WITH THE NEED TO DRAFT A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE HAD HOPED THAT THIS DOCUMENT WOULD REFLECT AN HONEST APPRAISAL OF THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF THE MEETING AND THAT IT WOULD ALSO CONTAIN A NUMBER OF CONCRETE STEPS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN CSCE, AS WELL AS NOTING THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE NEXT SIMILAR MEETING. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS AND

THEIR SUPPORTERS REFUSE TO ACCEPT A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THAT WOULD HAVE HONESTLY REFLECTED WHAT ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE IN BELGRADE. INSTEAD, AFTER FIRST PUSHING FOR A SOVIET DRAFTED DOCUMENT THAT IGNORED HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND MADE NO MENTION OF CONTINUING "PROBLEM AREAS" IN PERFORMANCE, THE SOVIETS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ONLY A SHORT NON-SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT.

THE ALLIES CORRECTLY REJECTED ALL SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE A LESS THAN HONEST CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OR ONE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNBALANCED BY CONCENTRATING ONLY ON

THOSE ISSUES PALATABLE TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES.  
THE NATO COUNTRIES LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED  
TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT GIVEN THE  
PROPER BASIS. HOWEVER THE EASTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO  
REJECT ALL SUCH ENTREATIES AND THE NATO ALLIES WERE  
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FINALLY OBLIGED TO AGREE TO WHAT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO AS  
A NON-SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT BECAUSE OF THE RULE  
OF CONSENSUS WHICH GOVERNED THE PROCEEDINGS AT BELGRADE.  
IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH  
FINALLY EMERGED IS NOT WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE WEST SINCE  
IT CONTINUES THE CSCE PROCESS BY PROVIDING FOR THE MADRID  
MEETING TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FALL OF 1980. IT ALSO RE-  
COMMITTS ALL STATES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE EAST, TO IMPL-  
MENT FULLY ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, RECOGNIZES  
THAT DIFFERENT VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED ON THE LEVEL OF CSCE  
IMPLEMENTATION, AND RECOGNIZES THAT CSCE IMPLEMENTATION  
IS "ESSENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETENTE."

ALTHOUGH THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT DID NOT INCLUDE WESTERN  
IDEAS ON CONCRETE MEASURES FOR ENHANCING CSCE, A NUMBER  
OF SPECIFIC NEW IDEAS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED AT THE  
CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY IN HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL  
AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING FIELDS, ARE OF GREAT POTENTIAL AND  
SHOULD NOT SIMPLY EXPIRE A BUREAUCRATIC DEATH. IN OUR  
VIEW, THESE MEASURES REMAIN "ON THE TABLE" AND SHOULD BE  
SERIOUSLY EXPLORED IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTACTS  
SO THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM CAN BE REFINED AND GENERALLY  
AGREED UPON BY THE MADRID CONFERENCE. THROUGH SUCH A  
CAREFUL, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS, ON A BALANCED BASIS, WE  
CAN GO FAR TO PROMOTE THE TYPE OF HUMANE AND SECURE  
DETENTE WHICH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT--BY ITS VERY TERMS--  
ENVISAGES.

IN OUR VIEW, CSCE REMAINS ONE OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF  
DETENTE AND WE INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO

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ENHANCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN COMING YEARS. WE ARE  
DISAPPOINTED IN THE RESULTS SO FAR, BUT NOT DISCOURAGED  
TO THE POINT OF ABANDONING OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE CSCE REAL  
SUBSTANCE. WE WILL, CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO MONITOR  
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COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT AND TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO  
DO SO, WHETHER THEY BE GOVERNMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS OR  
INDIVIDUALS. WE WILL ALSO, IN A SPIRIT OF SELF-ANALYSIS,  
EXAMINE AREAS IN WHICH UNITED STATES PERFORMANCE COULD BE  
IMPROVED. WE WILL SET A POSITIVE EXAMPLE OF COOPERATING



TO THE FULLEST WITH CSCE MONITORING GROUPS WHICH MAY BE FORMED IN THE UNITED STATES AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL FIND IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO COOPERATE WITH THE MONITORING GROUPS WHICH MAY BE FORMED IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DETENTE CSCE CAN MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO AMELIORATING THE LIVES OF PEOPLE IN ALL SIGNATORY COUNTRIES. IT IS THIS HUMAN DIMENSION OF CSCE WHICH MAKES IT A UNIQUE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND WHICH, MORE THAN ANY OTHER FACTOR, SOLIDIFIES UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE PROCESS. WE INTEND THROUGH OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE CSCE PROCESS TO GIVE DETENTE, IN THE WORDS OF US CHIEF DELEGATE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, A "MORE HUMAN DIMENSION AND A HUMAN FACE," AND WE HOPE THAT ALL SIGNATORY COUNTRIES TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WILL JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT.

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